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Hunga, Refugees, and the Law
of Return
MARYELLEN FULLERTON*
Abstract
In the past decade Hungary has transformed itself from a refugee producing country into
a refugee receiving country. Between 1948 and 1988 only a few thousand refugees came
to Hungary. Suddenly, near the end of the 1980s, thousands more sought refuge in
Hungary. By mid-1991 more than 50,000 refugees from Romania had entered Hungary.
In the last six months of 1991 another 50,000 refugees entered Hungary, most of whom
came from former Yugoslavia. More came in the subsequent years. From 1988 through
1995 Hungary registered more than 130,000 refugees, and many more may have entered
Hungary without formally requesting asylum. Refugees who came to Hungary entered a
country with an undeveloped refugee policy and a patchwork of legislation and government
decrees concerning refugees and migrants. The government's attempt to establish a
modem refugee system based on this rudimentary framework has been distorted by a
powerful preference for protecting refugees of Hungarian ancestry. This preference
permeates the laws and the administration of the refugee system. Although the law is
written in neutral terms, the reality of refugee status in Hungary is that it is largely
reserved for ethnic Hungarians. Other asylum seekers are rejected or shunted into
temporary protection status. In effect, the refugee law functions as a Law of Return. This
distortion of the refugee system to accomplish an immigration goal has multiple negative
effects. It leads to the rejection of legitimate non-Hungarian refugees. It encourages the
acceptance of ethnic Hungarians who are not refugees. It misleads international donors
and misallocates the ever-dwindling resources devoted to refugees. It undermines the rule
of law in a country struggling to establish it. Only by applying its refugee law impartially
to all asylum seekers, no matter what their ethnic heritage, can Hungary live up to its
international obligations and create confidence in the soundness of its refugee policy.
Introduction
In Hungary in 1995 everything and everyone is in transition. The
economy is on a bumpy path heading away from central command
toward market forces. The government, controlled by democratically
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. The author wishes to thank the Gennan Marshall
Fund of the United States for the fellowship that enabled this research to be undertaken and Brooklyn
Law School for the grant that supported the transformation of the data collected into written form.
The fieldwork was done during the 1994-95 academic year and this article depicts the evolving
refugee situation in Hungary at that time.
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elected former communists, is learning to speak the language of
parliamentary democracy.' It is also confronting the growing fiscal crisis
with tough austerity measures. The population is grappling with rising
prices as state subsidies are cut: the new homeless crowd into railroad
and subway stations as the new rich blast through the streets outside in
their BMWs.
Refugee issues in Hungary are no exception: they are also in a state
of flux, with dramatic pendulum swings during the last decade. Until the
late 1980s Hungary was a refugee producing country. Since 1987 Hungary
has become a refugee receiving country. Indeed, Hungary has become a
refugee receiving country in a big way. From 1988 through 1995 Hungary
registered more than 130,000 refugees. Many more may have entered
Hungary, sought private assistance, and never informed the authorities
of their presence.
This situation, too, is in transition. By late 1994 the refugee population
registered in Hungary had dwindled to less than 8,000. The government
refugee office suddenly had empty and half-filled refugee camps on its
hands. It had staff to pay and buildings to heat, but few refugees. First,
there were no refugees; then too many; later not enough!
The pendulum swung again in 1995. New ethnic cleansing and renewed
combat in Bosnia2 sent more refugees to Hungary in the spring and
summer. The government opened a refugee camp that had been
mothballed as excess capacity. Officials braced for a new flood of people
needing refuge and protection, and close to 6,000 asylum seekers arrived.
Meanwhile, the legal framework for refugee protection is also in
transition. There is a patchwork of legislation and government decrees,
much of it dating back to the pre-1990 communist regime. Enormous
gaps exist. There are rumours that new refugee legislation will be passed,
and reports that drafts of legislation have circulated within the Ministry
of Interior, but everything is vague and indefinite. New statutes on
citizenship and on foreigners were enacted in 1993, but nothing on
refugees.
The sense of transition and feeling of barely controlled chaos are not
unique to Hungary. Other countries in Central Europe, and elsewhere
in the world, are experiencing similar transformations. In at least one
important respect, though, Hungary is unique. A very large proportion
1 In earlyJune 1994, the second post-communist free elections saw the Hungarian Socialist Party
(MSZP), which is the resurrected Communist Party, win a majority (209 of 386) of seats in the
Parliament. Laura Chappell-Brown, 'Why Do Communists Keep Winning Free Elections?' Batimore
Sun, 5Jun. 1994, 5E. The Socialists chose to form a coalition with the alliance of Free Democrats,
a liberal party led by former dissidents who espouse free-market economy. Craig R. Whitney,
'Leaders Back Free Hungary Plus Stability', Nay rork Tnes, 25 Jun. 1994, A3.
2 Stephen Kinzer, 'Conflict in the Balkans: The Refugees', Na rork TIMes, 14 Jul. 1995, A I
(thousands of refugees fled Srebrenica); Raymond Bonner, 'Conflict in the Balkans: The Refugees',
av 2.ork Tmes, 26 Jul. 1995 (2,000 forced out of Zepa).
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of the asylum seekers who come to Hungary are ethnic Hungarians. No
other country in the region experiences this 'return' phenomenon to
such a degree.3 This phenomenon has influenced the development of
refugee law and policy in Hungary.
This article examines the refugee laws in Hungary as written and as
applied. It begins by providing a short historical overview of migration
in Hungary since the First World War. It briefly describes refugee and
other population movements in the early twentieth century, at mid-
century, and at the century's end. The article then examines the Hungarian
refugee laws in light of this specific historical context. After evaluating
the laws, the article describes and analyses current practice. This
description draws largely on a recent year of field work, which firmly
roots the legal analysis in the current reality facing refugees in Hungary.
This article concludes that the current refugee system in Hungary
largely functions as a Law of Return. Since 1989 Hungary has taken a
series of steps to establish a basic legal framework for refugee protection.
Provisions in the new Constitution and in recent legislation grant rights
to refugees. Several decrees define refugee status and set forth a procedure
for determining refugee status. Traces of a preference for ethnic
Hungarians can be seen in the written refugee laws. The decree
implementing the 1951 Convention on Refugees imposes a geographic
reservation, stating that Hungary will only accept European refugees.
This drastically reduces Hungary's potential refugee population: most of
the refugees in the world and most of the countries that produce refugees
are not in Europe. Simultaneously, this measure effectively protects ethnic
Hungarian refugees, who tend to be in European countries, particularly
in contiguous countries.
In addition, the guarantee of asylum in the Hungarian Constitution
specifically offers protection to those persecuted on linguistic grounds.
Harassment and worse on linguistic grounds is a source of great tension
in ethnic Hungarian communities in Romania, Slovakia, and other
neighbouring countries. Moreover, the new citizenship legislation in
Hungary provides advantages for those granted refugee status. At the
same time, it offers even greater advantages for those, refugee or not, of
Hungarian descent.
The preference for ethnic Hungarians that can be detected in the laws
is even more pronounced in the administration of the refugee system.
3 The Aussiedler phenomenon in Germany, with its separate and parallel track for ethnic Germans
whose families have lived for generations outside Germany, is a response to another historical
diaspora. In Germany, however, the Aussider have a separate processing system and gain a status
different from that of 'foreign refugees'. They are not viewed as asylum seekers or refugees by the
international community (cf. art. lE, 1951 Convention), or the public at large, although there has
been public criticism of the Aussieder programme. See Alan Cowell, 'For Migrants to Germany,
Welcome Turns Sour', .New ork Tunes, 24 Mar. 1996.
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Ethnic Hungarians who enter Hungary seeking refuge are channelled
into the refugee system, while others who need refuge are channelled
into the temporary protection system. Access to the refugee system is not
the only area in which ethnic Hungarian asylum seekers receive an
advantage. The less favourable camp conditions and the restrictions on
freedom of movement appear to fall more heavily on those asylum seekers
who are not ethnic Hungarians. The reality of refugee status in Hungary
is that it is largely reserved for ethnic Hungarians.
On its face, the law does not limit the applicants for refugee status,
and not all ethnic Hungarians who apply for refugee status receive it.
Nonetheless, almost all successful candidates for refugee status are ethnic
Hungarians. In contrast, the large numbers of asylum seekers fr9m other
backgrounds are generally shunted into temporary protection status.
There they receive food and shelter and other basic necessities, but they
lack any substantial legal protection.
This two tier system has led to many who qualify under the Hungarian
and the 1951 Convention never receiving refugee status and its attendant
legal protection. Almost all of those who have not been recognized as
refugees have lacked Hungarian ancestry. At the same time, a substantial
number of those recognized in Hungary appear to be immigrants rather
than refugees. Many describe leaving lives of hardship and diminished
opportunities, to be sure. Personal interviews with many different
individuals granted refugee status lead to the conclusion that the hardship
frequently did not constitute persecution. Almost all in this category were
ethnic Hungarians.
The result is that Hungary, which does not have a law allowing
immigration based on ethnic heritage, has distorted its refugee system to
accomplish an immigration goal. Moreover, in counting immigrants as
refugees, Hungary has effectively inflated the size of its refugee population,
thereby misleading donors and increasing the amount of contributions
received from the international community for refugee assistance. Whether
the international community would be equally generous in providing
assistance to Hungary for the resettlement of ethnic Hungarian immigrants
is doubtful.
Simultaneously, Hungary has created the functional equivalent of a
Law of Return, allowing those who share the ethnic background of the
citizens of Hungary to enter the society and become full members.
Although there are relatively few nations with a Law of Return, notably
Israel, Germany and Greece, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with
Hungary's aims. What is objectionable is accomplishing this goal by
misusing the refugee process, which has obvious negative consequences
for the refugee programme itself. It also has negative consequences
for international efforts to raise ever-dwindling funds to support ever-
increasing refugees. In addition, it has negative consequences for the rule
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of law in Hungary. A country newly freed from one party rule should
develop the contours of an important social policy such as immigration
in the legislative arena. Recent legislation concerning immigration does
not provide a right to immigrate based on ancestry. This suggests that
Parliament does not want to establish a Law of Return at this time, and
the refugee system should not be manipulated to create one.
1. The historical legacy
1.1 From Sarajevo I to Sarajevo 11
The assassination of Franz-Ferdinand, the Archduke of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, in Sarajevo in 1914 ignited the conflagration of the
First World War, the flames from which consumed the Hungarian part
of the empire, as well as the larger Austrian portion. The ensuing peace
treaties punished Hungary, one of the losers, by radically redrawing its
boundaries. 4 Under the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, Hungary lost two-thirds
of its territory and its population. 5 Its territory shrank from 125,000
square miles to 36,000 square miles, while its population fell from 21
million to 7.5 million.6 In 1920 this meant that large populations of
Hungarians fell within the newly enlarged boundaries of the bordering
States, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia, a situation that
continues to the present day.'
In the first few years after the borders were redrawn in 1920, there
was significant migration into and out of Hungary. 8 Approximately
4 'The peacemakers of 1919 fulfilled ... the bargains made with Italy and Rumania in order to
bring them into the war ... The Rumanians insisted on the historical unity of Transylvania and
added claims to Hungarian territory on ethnic grounds ... ' AJ.P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy
1809-1918, (1948), 272-3. It is difficult to comment on this issue without making a political statement
about the legitimacy ofpolitical control in the region, and especially in Transylvania. The important
point is that major changes in territory and population occurred.5 JuditJuh5sz, International Migration in Hungary (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author). Vicki Goldberg, 'All-Conquering Hungarians, Empire or No', New ork Tows, 3 Dec. 1995,
H47. PMI PEter T6th, 'Refugees, Immigrants and New Citizens in Hungary, 1988-1992', in Maryellen
Fullerton et al., eds., Refugees and Migrants: Hungay at a Crossroads, (1995), 69, 71 (hereafter Fullerton
et al., Refugees and Mgrants).
6 Ibid.
7 Hungarian citizens who fell outside the new smaller territory of Hungary could choose to
maintain Hungarian citizenship by moving to the reconfigured Hungary or stay and take up the
citizenship of the State now exercising authority over the land where they lived. T6th, above note
5, at 70. Many of the areas formerly part of the Kingdom of Hungary included large populations
of non-Hungarians. For example, the majority of the population of Transylvania was Romanian
even when Transylvania was formally part of the Kingdom of Hungary; in 1910 Hungarians made
up 34% of the population, while Romanians comprised 55% and Germans 9%. Taylor, above note
4, 289. Nonetheless, there were many communities of Hungarians and Germans whose families had
lived in Transylvania for centuries, while political power had been in the hands of the Hungarian
population.
Juhfsz, above note 5, at 5.
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200,000 ethnic Hungarians moved to Hungary, while 25,000 emigrants
left Hungary for the United States.9 After 1925, emigration, immigration,
and refugee flows slowed to a trickle.10 This changed with the advent of
the Second World War, and from 1938 to 1941 the Nazis rewarded
Hungary through a series of re-annexations. Hungary expanded its
territory by 78,680 square miles and its population by five million."
Many fled Hungary. For those who did not or could not flee, worse was
to come. German troops occupied Hungary in March 1944, and in the
next four months they deported 440,000 Hungarian Jews. 2 By the war's
end, they had exterminated over 560,000 Hungarian Jews, 3 with the
once thriving Jewish community reduced to 150,000, many of whom
were in Budapest.
14
In the wake of the Second World War, Hungary's borders were restored
generally to the 1920 configuration." The refugee flow became a torrent.
Over 100,000 people fled Hungary, 6 and major population exchanges
and deportations occurred: Approximately 200,000 ethnic Germans left
the country, mostly forcibly removed; 7 roughly 70,000 Slovaks left, in
exchange for 70,000 ethnic Hungarians who arrived from
Czechoslovakia. 8 Ethnic Hungarians also came from other countries:
125,000 from Transylvania, now in Romania; 45,000 from the Vojvodina
province of Yugoslavia; 25,000 from the Soviet Union. 9
The communist regime that took control in 1948 closed the borders.
Illegal departure became a crime,2" and for the next eight years very few
Hungarians fled from Hungary, and even fewer people fled to Hungary.2
1.2 The 1956 Revolution and its aftermath
The 1956 Revolution brought a dramatic change. After Russian tanks
crushed the revolt, 200,000 refugees fled Hungary in three months.22
This included more than 4 per cent of the population of Budapest.2
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., at 5-6.
1 T6th, above note 5, at 71; roughly half of the reacquired population was ethnic Hungarian.
12 T6th, above note 5, at 71; Randolph L. Braham, 'Hungary Jews During the Holocaust', in
Engyclopedia of the Holocaust, v.2, 698, 702 (Israel Gutman ed., 1990).
Ibid., 703.
14 Ibid., 698, 703.
's T6th, above note 5, at 72. There were also additional changes: The sub-Carpathian region,
now part of Ukraine, was taken from Czechoslovakia and given to the Soviet Union, while another
area of the former Kingdom of Hungary was given to Czechoslovakia.
,6 Juhisz, above note 5, at 7; T6th, above note 5, at 72-3 (citing estimates as high as 800,000).
17 Juhfiz, above note 5, at 7.
18 Ibid.
'9 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 BoldizsAr Nagy, 'Asylum Seekers and Refugees: Hungarian Dilemmas', 34 ActaJuidica Hungarica
2841992).
Juh~sz, above note 5, at 7.
23 Ibid.
Hungay, Refugees, and the Law of Return 505
Towns near the western border with Austria lost more than 12 per cent
of their population.2' The brain drain that characterized this population
movement was astounding. Ninety per cent of the refugees were under
40; 25 per cent were professionals; the majority of the manual workers
were skilled employees.25 In 1957 the borders were again sealed. Few
Hungarians were allowed to leave legally, and those who left illegally
faced criminal penalties and were stripped of their citizenship.26
Official statistics on both legal and illegal departures were secret so the
dimensions of the refugee flow in the following decades are unclear.
27
Recently revealed data suggest that over 50,000 people departed illegally
in the 1960s and 1970s.28 Many who fled to the West were automatically
treated as political refugees, with only perfunctory investigation of their
circumstances and claims.
29
This changed in the 1980s. Hungarians continued to leave at the rate
of roughly 5,000 per year,3° but their reception as refugees in Western
Europe and North America was less automatic, however, as the goulash
communism of Hungary and its liberalized passport regulations did not
conform to the standard profile of a persecuting regime."
Even as the numbers of Hungarians granted refugee status in other
countries declined, there still were more refugees leaving Hungary than
refugees entering Hungary. Between 1948 and 1988 very few people
sought refuge in Hungary. The borders were closely guarded, and the
admission of refugees was a political matter decided at the highest levels. 2
Approximately 3,000 Greek communists fleeing the aftermath of civil
war in Greece were granted refuge in the 1940s.3' Roughly 1,000 Chilean
communists were accepted in the 1970s. 3 4 In rare cases an individual
revolutionary from Africa or Asia was also given asylum. In addition,
24 Ibid., at 7-8.
25 Ibid.
26 T6th, above note 5, at 73.
27 Juhsz, above note 5, at 8. Some say that as many as 8,000-10,000 emigrated per year T6th,
above note 5, at 73.
28 Juh~sz, above note 5, at 8, says that 20,000 left legally between 1963 and 1979 and 50,000
left illegally. Although she refers to recently published figures, she does not provide the source. This
information was so politically sensitive for decades that it should be treated with caution.
29 Boldizs~r Nagy, 'Hungarian Refugee Law', in Howard Adelman et al., eds., The Genesis of A
Domesti Regime: 7e Case ofHungary, 49 (1994).
30 77e Economist, 23 Dec. 1989, 27; Nagy, above note 29, at 62 n.3; M~ria Rfdei, 'Hungary's
Migration Trends: The Past One Hundred Years and the Problem of Future Projects', Howard
Adelman et al., eds., 27M Genesi of A Domestic Regime: the Case of Hungay, 22 (1994); Juhsz, above
note 5, at 8 (Ministry of Interior statistics show 4,000-6,000 annual Emigr~s during the 1980s; some
experts suggest 10,000 is more accurate).
I Juh~sz, above note 5, at 8; Nagy, above note 29, at 49.
32 Juhisz, above note 5, at 8; Nagy, above note 29, at 50.
33 Nagy, above note 29, at 62 n.2.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., at 49-50.
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the strictly protected borders and travel restrictions in neighbouring
countries prevented travel through Hungary.3"
1.3 Exodus from Transylvania
Hungary became a refugee receiving country again in the 1980s.
Surprisingly, this occurred before the fall of the communist regime in
1989. The transformation, which began in earnest at the end of 1987,
was a delayed consequence of the post-First World War border changes,
aggravated by the post-Second World War communist regimes in the
region. By the mid 1980s, roughly ten million Hungarians lived in
Hungary, while five million or so live outside the borders. Three and a half
million lived in neighbouring countries, often in close-knit communities. 3'
The Trianon Treaty left close to two million ethnic Hungarians in
Romania.38 In the 1980s they found life there more and more desperate,
as did many people in Romania, but the minority status of the ethnic
Hungarians compounded the difficulties.39 They often faced great
discrimination, increased pressure against the use of the Hungarian
language in the schools, and quotas that limited their children's chances
for higher education.'
A large part of the ethnic Hungarian population in Romania lived in
Transylvania, the region bordering Hungary.4 Able to speak the language,
often having relatives in Hungary,42 many of them entered Hungary as
visitors and simply stayed. Although their status was illegal,' they refused
to return to Romania. By the end of 1988 there were more than 13,000
asylum seekers in Hungary, 95 per cent of whom were ethnic Hungarians
36 Juhdsz, above note 5, at 8; cf. T6th, above note 5, at 75, (annual migration of 1,500 prior to
1984 may largely have been ethnic Hungarians from neighbouring socialist countries.)
37 Michael J. Jordan, 'Slovakia, Hungary Ink Treaty', Budapest Sun, 23-29 Mar. 1995, at I
(600,000 in Slovakia, 1.7 million in Romania, 200,000 in Ukraine, 450,000 in Croatia and Serbia).
38 Ibid.
9 T6th, above note 5, at 74-5; Nagy, above note 21, at 28.
40 Nagy, above note 21, at 43 n. 44.
41 Many ethnic Hungarian communities in Transylvania are located in the eastern part of
Transylvania, with large communities of Romanians between them and the Hungarian border to
the west: Taylor, above note 4, at 290.
42 Endre SikJ. Tarj .nyi, Tibor Zavecz, 'Sociological Characteristics of Refugees and their Flight
from Transylvania', in Adelman et al., Genesis of A Domestc Regine, 25, 33 (hereafter Sik et al.) -
74% of the refugees between 1987 and 1989 had relatives in Hungary; 43% had friends in Hungary.
43 Nagy, above note 21, at 28. As citizens of a Warsaw Pact country, they were able to cross the
border without visas. Endre Sik &Judit T6th, 'The Role of Governmental and Nongovernmental
Organizations in Hungarian Refugee Policy', in Adelman et al., Genesis ofA Domestic Regime, 65, 66
(hereafter Sik & T6th). Nonetheless, many illegally crossed the 'green' (areas away from authorized
border crossing stations) border. Boldizsdr Nagy, 'The Refugee Situation in Hungary. Where
Now?' 32 AWR Bulletin 125, 127 (1994).
44 Sik et al., above note 42, at 28-9. Refugees could obtain a temporary residence card to legalize
their stay in Hungary for a short term. Most received a permit for only one month, although
gradually the authorities began issuing them for longer periods.
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from Romania.'5 The Hungarian government called them 'aliens
provisionally residing in Hungary' rather than refugees, but it refused to
send them back.' The government even established a Settlement Fund
to help accommodate the asylum seekers.47 For the first time in Central
Europe, a socialist country implicitly acknowledged persecution in sister
socialist states and refused to force refugees to return."8
The exodus from Romania continued and quickened in 1989. In that
year alone more than 17,000 asylum seekers arrived in Hungary, most
from Romania. 9 There were nearly 11,000 ethnic Hungarians, 5,500
ethnic Romanians, and almost 1,000 ethnic Germans. 0 The numbers
increased again in 1990. This was a surprise. Many had predicted that
the overthrow of Ceausescu in December 1989 would slow the exodus.
Instead the reverse happened. There was fighting between ethnic
Hungarians and Romanians in Tirgu Mures, Romania in the spring of
1990. Three people died and hundreds were injured.5" There was more
violence in Bucharest in the summer.52 This heightened the fear in the
ethnic Hungarian communities; over 18,000 asylum seekers came to
Hungary in 1990, more than 17,000 of them from Romania. Nearly
15,000 were ethnic Hungarians; 2,400 were ethnic Romanians; and 100
were ethnic Germans. 3
Asylum seekers continued to arrive in 1991, but the rate of arrivals
slowed considerably. During the first six months approximately 3,000
asylum seekers entered, mostly ethnic Hungarians from Romania.5"
Despite the decreasing numbers, the overall impact was substantial. In
less than four years a country that had received a minuscule number
of refugees during the preceding 40 years suddenly was sheltering
52,000. Of these 50,000 were from Romania, including 40,000 ethnic
Hungarians.55
4s Nagy, above note 29, at 52. See also Table 1, at 51 (13,173 asylum seekers in Hungary in
1988, of whom, 13,098 came from Romania, of whom 11,745 were in turn ethnic Hungarians,
1,097 ethnic Romanians; 256 ethnic Germans).
46 Ibid., at 2.
47 Government Decree of 28 June 1988; Nagy, above note 43, at 127.
48 This presaged the more well-known Hungarian government decision in 1989 to allow thousands
of citizens of the German Democratic Republic to seek asylum at the West German embassy in
Budapest See Peter Cipkowsld, Revolution in Eastern Europe, 52-3, 72-6 (1991). The 1989 situation
was different, though, in that it did not involve ethnic Hungarians seeking to remain in Hungary.
49 Nagy, above note 29, at 51 (Table 1) (calculations based on data provided by the Hungarian
Degartment of Refugee Affairs of the Ministry of the Interior).
'Ibid.
51 MiehaelJ.Jordan, 'Slovalda, Hungary Ink Treaty', Budapest Sun, 23-29 Mar. 1995, 1-2; John
Kifner, 'Upheaval in the East', New Tork Tines, 27 Mar. 1990, atA 13.
52 Celestine Bohlen, 'Evolution in Europe: Romanians Ponder Burst of Violence', New Tork Ties,
16Aun. 1990, 4: hundreds injured when pro-government miners rampaged through city.
Nagy, above note 29, at 51 (Table 1).
' Ibid.
51 Ibid.
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1.4 Sarajevo II
Then the dam burst. War broke out on Hungary's southern border
between Croatia and Serbia in the summer of 1991 and the number of
asylum seekers sky-rocketed. 6 Hungarian border guards faced desperate
groups of civilians fleeing the fighting. Most were from the Baranyi
triangle, 7 an area of Croatia near Vukovar. Shell-shocked and disoriented,
many had left their homes on only several hours notice.58 In the last half
of 1991, more than 52,000 people - more than the entire existing
refugee population - sought refuge in Hungary. 9 Thus, within six
months the refugee population doubled. In addition, many more refugees
may have entered and never registered with the authorities." Most of
the asylum seekers that arrived in 1991 were ethnic Croats.6
In 1992 the war zone in former Yugoslavia shifted. Serbian forces
attacked Bosnia and Herzegovina in April.62 More refugees, this time
mostly Bosnians,63 streamed into Hungary. Again, many fled in the most
desperate and disorienting circumstances with only a few hours notice.
By the end of 1992 over 16,000 new asylum seekers have arrived, more
than 15,000 of them from ex-Yugoslavia, 4 with the majority Bosnians,
but one-third ethnic Hungarians.65
The flow of the dispossessed slowed in 1993 and 1994. Approximately
5,000 asylum seekers arrived in 1993 and 3,000 in 1994.66 As if a
pendulum had swung, the refugee flows again altered. Although people
still arrived from former Yugoslavia, the majority of asylum seekers now
r6 Blaine Harden, 'Army Offensive in Croatia Draws European Warning, Washington Post, 27
Au. 1991, Al.
Interview, J6nos Pavlic, Deputy Mayor, Siklos, Hungary, 2 Dec. 1994.
Nagy, above note 43, at 128; Harden, above note 56.
59 Nagy, above note 43, at 128; Z61tin Dov~nyi, 'Spatial Aspects of the Refugee Issue in Hungary',
in Fullerton et al., eds., Refugees and Migrants, 17, 18.
60 Nagy, above note 43, at 130.
61 Ibid., at 128. In the first 5 months of 1991, 2,629 asylum seekers arrived in Hungary, of whom
approximately 80% were ethnic Hungarians from Romania. In 1991 as a whole, 54,693 asylum
seekers arrived in Hungary, of whom approximately 10% were Romanian citizens and 87% were
Yu oslav citizens.
Chuck Sudetic, 'Ethnic Clashes Increase in Bosnia as Europe Recognition Vote Nears', New
Xork Tmes, 6 Apr. 1992, 12;John F. Bums, 'Cease-Fire Holds in Yugoslav Republic', New rork Times,
26 Apr. 1992, A 16: 370,000 refugees fled homes and sought UNHCR assistance in past 3 weeks.
6' Croat, Serb, Albanian, and Russian asylum seekers also arrived, according to government
records: Nagy, above note 43, at 128.
6 Ibid.
r The statistics do not indicate which part of former Yugoslavia the refugees were fleeing. Many
were likely from the Vojvodina region of Serbia, where most of the 450,000 ethnic Hungarians live:
Nagy, above note 43, at 128. Many young men in Vojvodina faced conscription into the Serbian
forces: Dbv6nyi, above note 59, at 19-20.
66 Menekal6k Magyarorszkgon (1988-1995) = Refugees in Hungary (1988-1995), prepared by
Menekttiwgyi Es Migraci6s Hivatal Informatikai Oszt&Iy = Office of Refugees and Migration Affairs,
Information Department, Jan. 1996 (hereafter ORMA Statistics, 1988-1995).
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were ethnic Hungarians, with significant numbers from the Vojvodina
region of Serbia."
The lull of 1993 and 1994 continued through the first half of 1995,
although everyone worried that major fighting in ex-Yugoslavia would
begin again and trigger further flight. Nonetheless, the number of
individuals who lived as refugees in Hungary dwindled to a startling
degree. By the end of 1994 there were only 1,693 individuals in refugee
camps; in addition, the government provided financial subsidies to 6,045
refugees living in private accommodation. 68 Although the Serb offensives
in July 1995 that overran 'safe areas' in Srebrenica and Zepa created
major new refugee movements,69 few of those refugees reached Hungary.70
In the seven years from 1988 to 1995, Hungary received
133,000 refugees. Of these, 76,000 were from ex-Yugoslavia and
54,000 from Romania.71 Only 7,700 of those from ex-Yugoslavia remained
registered in 1995 as refugees receiving temporary protection in
Hungary.72 Only 4,000 others, mostly ethnic Hungarians from Romania,
received official refugee status.73 Roughly 120,000 are no longer visible,
but no one knows where they have gone. Many have probably left
Hungary; many others have probably stayed but in a non-refugee status.
Much appears to depend on the country of origin and the ethnic
background of the refugees.
Of those who fled ex-Yugoslavia, approximately 68,000 are no longer
visibly present. The consensus is that most Croats have returned, if not
to their homes, then to other areas not occupied by the Serbs. 74 As
the Croats comprised the overwhelming majority of refugees from ex-
Yugoslavia, 5 this accounts for most of the decrease. Others granted
temporary protection in Hungary have gone elsewhere, mainly to western
67 Nagy, above note 43, at 128; in 1993, Hungary received 5,366 asylum seekers, ofwhom 4,321
were ethnic Hungarians.
68 Menekaltolgyi Statisztika (1994.6v) =Refugee Statistics (1994), prepared by ORMA (above, note
66),Jan. 1995, at 12.
6 Kinzer, above note 2: Serb forces drove more than 40,000 Muslims from their homes in
Srebrenica; Bonner, above note 2: more than 2,000 forced out of Zepa.
'0 ORMA Statistics, 1988-1995, above note 66: 5,912 asylum seekers registered in 1995, 1,879
by 30 Jun. 1995. Thus, although many thousands were forced to flee in July 1995 (Kinzer, above
note 2), only 4,000 asylum seekers registered in Hungary betweenJuly-December 1995.
" ORMA Statistics, 1988-1995, above note 66.
72 Frank Laczk6, 'Temporary Protection and Ex-Yugoslav Refugees in Hungary', in Fullerton, et
a, Refugees andM grans, 171, 172.
7' ORMA Statistics, 1988-1995, above note 66; Laczk6, above note 72, at 173.
74 Nagy, above note 43, at 43; Laczk6, above note 72, at 172; Lajos Horvith, 'Asylum Seekers
at Nagyatid', in Fullerton, et al., Refiugees and Mgrants, 145 n. 2: in 1991 Croats comprised 85% of
the population at the refugee camp at Nagyatfd; by early 1994, they comprised less than 10% and
Bosnians comprised nearly 80%.
75 Nagy, above note 43, at 128: 35,000 asylum seekers fled from ex-Yugoslavia to Hungary from
June-September 1991; 70% were Croats. Croatia shares a long border with Hungary, while Bosnians
must cross Croatia or Serbia.
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Europe.76 This is said to be a small number, mostly Bosnians, but no
reliable data are available. Of the 7,000 from ex-Yugoslavia who remain,
approximately one-third are Bosnian Muslims, one-third are ethnic
Hungarians from Vojvodina in Serbia, one-quarter are Croats, and one-
tenth are Serbs and Albanians from Kosovo in Serbia.77
Of the refugees from Romania, approximately 54,000 came to Hungary,
and 4,000 have been granted official refugee status." Again, reliable data
about the other 50,000 are unavailable. Several hundred are reported to
have returned to Romania and several thousand to have moved on to
and settled in the West.79 Several thousand may have acquired Hungarian
citizenship through naturalization," although that appears an overly
optimistic projection since the Hungarian naturalization process works
so slowly that it is likely that most applications filed in the late 1980s
have not yet been decided.8 Others have, no doubt, acquired temporary
and permanent resident status, but no one knows how many. It appears
that most of the 'missing' 50,000 who came from Romania are still in
Hungary, but have not been recognized as refugees.8 2
2. The legal framework
One reason so little is known of the 133,000 refugees who arrived between
1988 and 1995 is the sketchy legal framework for refugee protection in
Hungary. There is little coordination between the laws that exist, and a
great many refugee issues are simply not addressed by any of the laws.
The foundation of Hungarian refugee law is the 1951 Geneva
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.83 Various government
76 Nagy, above note 43, at 129. Some estimate that 10,000 went west, but there are no reliable
statistics. Some went legally, some illegally on false documents, others illegally with no documents:
Interview, Lajos Horvith, Director, NagyatAd Refugee Camp, 1 Dec. 1994.
77 Laczk6, above note 72, at 172.
8 ORMA Statistics, 1988-1995, above note 66. Approximately 30,000 asylum seekers from
Romania had entered Hungary before October 1989, when Hungary officially became bound by
the 1951 Geneva Convention. The procedural rules implementing the Convention provided that
those already within Hungary had 30 days in which to file an application for refugee status:
§21, 101/1989. (IX.28.): MT rendelet a menektilkdnt val6 elismer&sr6l = Cabinet Decree 101 of
28 Sept. 1989 on the Recognition Process for Refugees (hereafter Decree 101, discussed below in
text accompanying notes 123-35). Very few of the 30,000 asylum seekers applied: Nagy, above note
29, at 50.
79 Nagy, above note 43, at 129.
8o Ibid. Nagy notes that there were 66,408 Romanian immigrants from 1988-1992 and that
13,569 Romanian citizens were naturalized during that time. He doubts that many of the 13,569
naturalized were part of the 66,408 because the naturalization process is notoriously slow.
81 Nagy, above note 43, at 129.
82 Ibid. Cf. Nagy, above note 21, at 31: close to 20,000 may have become citizens through
naturalization; more than 10,000 have decided to become permanent resident aliens.
83 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees: 189 UNTS 150; 19 U.S.T. 6260; T.IAS.
No. 6577 (hereafter 1951 Convention).
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decrees build on this international agreement, but most of the actual
practice stems from unwritten administrative policies that have developed
to fill yawning gaps in the legal structure.
2.1 International law
In early 1989, Hungary, still ruled by a communist government, became
a party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,' the
first East bloc country to do so." It also ratified the 1967 Protocol to the
1951 Convention.86 Although its accession to the Refugee Convention
signalled that Hungary was willing to accept the international definition
of refugee, it also erected a major barrier. Hungary conditioned its
ratification on an alternative narrow definition of those who qualify as
refugees, recognizing only those who fear persecution in Europe.87 Known
as the geographic reservation, this provision allows Hungary to limit its
obligations under the Convention to a small (and totally European) subset
of all the refugees in the world. This geographic reservation is currently
maintained by only four other countries - Malta, Monaco, Madagascar,
and Turkey - out of the 132 States party to the Convention and/or the
Protocol.88
Hungary bases its insistence on the geographic reservation on its fear
of being overwhelmed with refugees. Large numbers of potential refugees
obviously pose legitimate and serious concerns for a country. Nevertheless,
84 Hungary signed the Convention on 19 Mar. 1989.
85 Cipkowski, above note 48, at 72.
8 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees: 606 UJITS 267; 19 U.S.T. 6223; T.IAS.
No. 6577 (hereafter 1967 Protocol). Law-Decree No. 15 of 1989 [1989. Evi 15. tvr.] Magyar Kozldny
[Official Gazette] 1989, No. 60, p.10 2 2 is the Hungarian law that implements both the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol; it entered into force on 15 Oct. 1989. The 1951 Convention
came into effect for Hungary on 12Jun. 1990 and the 1967 Protocol on 14 Mar. 1990: Nagy, above
note 21, at 33 n. 13. The peculiarity that resulted in the Protocol becoming effective before the
Convention raises several interesting technical legal arguments about whether the former's broader
scope supersedes the latter's narrower scope, which Hungary opted for. See below, notes 87-9 and
accompanying text. As a practical matter, the narrower scope has been applied from the beginning;
this has been accepted by other parties and by UNHCR. See Boldizsir Nagy, 'Before or After the
Wave? Thoughts on the Adequacy of the Hungarian Refugee Law', 3 1JRL 529, 530 n.2 (1991).
87 The 1951 Convention, after defining a refugee in art. 1A(2), among others, by reference to
events occurring before 1Jan. 1951, offers State parties the option of further limiting its application
to refugees resulting from such events in Europe art. IB(1). By ratifying the Protocol, the Hungarian
government agreed to remove the 1951 deadline.
8 Multilateral Treaties deposited with the Seretay-Generah Status as at 31 December 1995: UN doc. ST/
LEG/SER.E/13 (1996). Up-to-date information on ratifications is available through UNHCR's
website at www.unhcr.ch/refworldl
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there are questions as to whether Hungary's fear on this score is well-
founded." No other Central European country which has ratified the
Convention has adopted the geographic reservation, and none has been
overrun with refugees, as experience in Poland and the Czech Republic
can show.
90
Some have argued that Hungary is in a more vulnerable geographic
position in terms of refugee flows. It is certainly nearer the Balkans than
Poland or the Czech Republic, and it has indeed received many thousands
more people fleeing the war in the Balkans. However, Hungary has not
afforded refugee status to most of these people, viewing them instead as
war victims. They are assisted by the government, but not given the legal
protection or status received by those recognized as refugees under the
Convention. 91 Moreover, as the Balkans are part of Europe, those fleeing
persecution there are not excluded from receiving protection in Hungary.
Rather, the geographic reservation precludes those fleeing persecution in
Africa and Asia from finding refuge in Hungary.
Others have asserted that Hungary needs to invoke the geographic
reservation because it is likely to be a magnet for asylum seekers from
other continents. As one of the Visegrid countries, Hungary has a more
advanced economy than many Central European States. The debates
are endless as to whether the economy is more robust in Hungary or the
Czech Republic or Poland. The answer, if there is one, is irrelevant.
What is relevant is the general perception that the economies in the Czech
Republic, Poland, and Hungary are all becoming stronger. Moreover, they
are all significantly ahead of the conditions in many of the countries that
89 Pursuant to an agreement between the Government of Hungary and UNHCR, promulgated
as 23/1990. (11.7.) MT rendelet [Cabinet Decree 23, 7 Feb. 1990], Magyar K6zlbny [Official
Gazette] 1990, No. 11, at 172, the UNHCR office interviews asylum seekers from countries outside
Europe. Very few have been found to have a well-founded fear. The Hungarian authorities have
granted short-term residency permits, but not work permits, to the few recognized by UNHCR and
their situation is tenuous: Nagy, above note 21, at 37-8. Surprisingly, between 1990 and 1995, only
136 non-Europeans were recognized as in need of protection in Hungary, of these, only 70 remain.
During that period, a total of 1,885 non-European asylum seekers applied in Hungary: Interview,
Agnes Ambrus, UNHCR Legal Protection Officer, Budapest, 1 Aug. 1995.9 Cf. the experience of the Czech Republic and Poland, neither of-which maintains the geographic
reservation. The Czech Refugee Department of the Ministry of the Interior reported 8,578 asylum
applications between 1990 and early 1995; of these, 4,365 were rejected, 2,535 did not complete
the proceedings, and refugee status was granted to 1,321 individuals. -Statistika Azyloeho Rizeni,
Ministry of Interior, Department for Refugees, 18Jan. 1995. In late 1994 the Refugee Department
stated that it was assisting 1,848 citizens of former Yugoslavia: Refugees it the Czech Republic, Dec.
1994. In Spring 1994 the Polish government reported 960 asylum seekers in Poland, 780 of whom
were from former Yugoslavia: UNHCR Liaison Office, Warsaw, 'Country Operations Plan 1994/
95/96'.
91 This bifurcation is also true in neighbouring countries. See, for example, Emma McClune,
'Returning Home Now Safe Option for Refugees', Budapest Sun, 14-20 Dec. 1995, A6: approximately
3,000 citizens of former Yugoslavia granted protection in Czech Republic; only 10 granted refugee
status.
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are triggering massive refugee flows. Yet neither the Czech Republic nor
Poland has been flooded by asylum seekers and refugees.
Still others have said that the geographic reservation is necessary in
Hungary because it is strategically located in terms of the transit routes
from other continents. This rationale, too, is unconvincing. The map
shows the central locations of Poland and the Czech Republic, while
foreign airlines routinely land in Warsaw and Prague. Transit routes from
East to West criss-cross not only Hungary, but all of Central Europe.
The absence of huge numbers of non-European asylum seekers in the
Czech Republic and Poland, as well as the Hungarian response to
European asylum seekers from ex-Yugoslavia, prompts a certain scepticism
at Hungary's insistence on the geographic reservation. The facts suggest
an alternative motivation. In light of the other laws and practices that
favour ethnic Hungarians, it appears that the government, consciously
or subconsciously, may have adopted the geographic reservation because
adhering to the 1951 Convention in this fashion could provide an avenue
for welcoming and protecting ethnic Hungarians from neighbouring
countries. Certainly, Hungary defines refugees as those fleeing persecution
anywhere in Europe, not just Hungarians. Nonetheless, what other large
group of Europeans, other than those fleeing ethnic cleansing and warfare
in former Yugoslavia, would likely seek refuge in Hungary? Viewed in
this light, Hungary's ratification of the 1951 Convention essentially
enabled the government to establish a 'law of return'92 via an international
treaty rather than through domestic legislation.9"
2.2 National law
Hungary's national laws on refugees, like its international obligations,
also date from the last communist government. The most salient provisions
include a recent constitutional amendment concerning asylum and several
92 In Sept. 1993 Hungary enacted legislation regulating the entry offoreigners, 1993. 6vi LXXXVI.
t6rvny a kflfoldiek beutazH.r6l, magyarorszigi tart6zkod sxir61 s bev6ndorl~h61 [Act LXXXVI
of 1993 on the Entry and Residence of Aliens and on Immigration] (hereafter Aliens Act). Sections
4-7 of the Aliens Act set forth the requirements for entry, sections 14-16, the provisions for obtaining
short-term and long-term residence permits, and sections 17-22 the circumstances in which foreigners
who have lived in Hungary legally for three or more years can seek immigration permits. The Act
does not provide ethnic Hungarians a right to immigrate to Hungary, but grants preferences to
those with close family members (grandparents, parents, spouse, children) in Hungary. section 17.
As a practical matter, the 1993 Aliens Act, as implemented by 64/1994. (IV.30.) Korm. rendelet
[Government Decree 64 of April 30, 1994] and 9/1994. (IV.30.) BM rendelet [Ministry of Interior
Decree 9 of April 30, 1994], has reduced immigration to Hungary to very low levels. See Justin
Burke, 'Hungary Tries to Stem Burgeoning Tide of European Refugees', Christian Science Monitor, 27
M:y 1994, 3.
Would supporters of the Bricker Amendment in the US Senate from 1948 to 1953 be surprised
to find a communist government relying on a treaty to circumvent the need for domestic legislation?
Senator Bricker and others strenuously opposed the internal application within the US of international
treaties on human rights. See, for example, Covey T. Oliver et al., 7e Intenational Legal System: Cases
and Materi4l, 1059 (4th ed., 1995).
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government decrees regulating different aspects of the asylum process. In
addition, the new legislation concerning citizenship has a significant
impact on those seeking permanent refuge in Hungary.
2.2.1 The Constitution
The 1949 Constitution of Hungary, enacted by the postwar communist
government, contained an asylum provision:
Everyone who is persecuted for his democratic behaviour, or for his activity to
enhance social progress, the liberation of peoples or the protection of peace,
may be granted asylum.'
This constitutional protection was exercised solely according to the whim
of the government. There was no legally enforceable right and no judicial
remedy.
95
In October 1989 the 1949 Constitution underwent a major revision. 96
The earlier asylum provision was repealed and replaced by a new
guarantee:
(1) The Republic of Hungary - in accordance with the provisions of law -
grants asylum for those foreign nationals, who in their country of nationality, or
for those stateless persons who in their residence, were persecuted for racial,
religious, national, linguistic or political reasons.
(2) A person granted asylum cannot be extradited to another State.
(3) The adoption of the law on asylum requires the votes of two-thirds of the
members of Parliament who are present.97
In the new Constitution, asylum is a right, rather than a matter of political
discretion. Those entitled to asylum are described more specifically than
in the earlier Constitution, and the description is generally in accord with
the internationally accepted refugee definition. Further, the Constitution
prevents easy amendment of laws concerning asylum. A super majority
of Parliament must agree before legislation on asylum can be enacted.98
Thus, politically popular restrictions on asylum cannot become law unless
proponents of the changes convince two-thirds of the legislators. In
94Art. 67, Hungarian Constitution (1949) (enacted as Law No. XX of 1949); Nagy, above note
29, at 62 n. 6.
95 Nagy, above note 29, at 50 ('decisions were purely political, based on the expressed will of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party').
96Law No. XXXI of 1989, Magyar K6zldny, [Official Gazette], 23 Oct. 1989, No. 74, at 1244,
amended the 1949 Constitution. Ironically, although approximately 90% of the original text has
been replaced, as a technical matter, it is the 1949 Constitution that is still legally in force: Nagy,
above note 29, at 62 nn. 6, 13. In 1995 Parliament established a commission to begin serious work
drafting a new constitution.
97 Art. 65, Hungarian Constitution (1989) (as enacted by Law No. XXXI of 1989), see note 96
above.
9 Art. 65(3), Hungarian Constitution (1989). Contrary to first impression, this requirement does
not explain the lack of asylum legislation. The coalition governing since the spring of 1994 controls
more than two-thirds of the Parliament, yet there is still no asylum law.
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addition, once an individual is granted asylum, he or she cannot be
extradited. This bar to extradition allows no exceptions.
99
The definition of those constitutionally entitled to asylum in Hungary
echoes the refugee definition of the 1951 Convention, but with several
crucial differences.' The most noticeable is that the Hungarian
Constitution contains no geographical limitation on those entitled to
asylum. This contradiction exists openly, but has not been addressed by
any of the institutions dealing with refugees in Hungary.' °' A quite
astounding anomaly results. The constitutional guarantee of asylum for
refugees fleeing persecution anywhere in the world is ignored, while the
geographical reservation to the 1951 Convention is followed.
In addition, the Hungarian Constitution protects those whose
persecution is due to one of five factors: racial, religious, nationality,
language, or political reasons. The 1951 Convention again is similar, but
not coextensive in scope.' 2 Four of the five categories are practically
identical, but the fifth is not. The Hungarian Constitution refers to
persecution for linguistic reasons, 0 3 while the 1951 Convention identifies
persecution based on membership in a particular social group."
The Hungarian Constitution's emphasis on persecution for linguistic
reasons is noteworthy in light of the millions of ethnic Hungarians who,
post-Trianon, live in neighbouring countries. The Hungarian communities
in Romania, Slovakia, and former Yugoslavia have emphasized the
importance of receiving schooling in the Hungarian language in order to
keep their culture alive. In Slovakia and Romania, in particular, there
have been serious and sustained disputes between ethnic Hungarians and
99 Art. 65(2), Hungarian Constitution (1989).
100 For example, the Hungarian Constitution mentions only those who have already experienced
persecution: art. 65(l). The 1951 Convention is broader, protecting those who have a well-founded
fear ofpersecution: art. 1A(2).
1 Indeed, the decree implementing the Convention is applied by the government, and the
constitutional definition is ignored: Nagy, above note 29, at 53-4.
1o2 The political element is phrased differently. The 1951 Convention refers to persecution for
reasons of political opinion, whereas the Hungarian Constitution refers to persecution for political
reasons: art. 65(1). It is hard to predict whether these different formulations may have a substantial
impact in practice. Hungarian officials and courts may conclude they are synonymous, or they might
adopt the approach of the United States Supreme Court, which expressly refused to consider the
political reasons or motives behind the persecutor's act, and instead focused exclusively on whether
the persecution was triggered by the persecutor's view of the victim's political opinion; see IN'S a
EHas-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
103 Art. 65(1), Hungarian Constitution (1989).
104 Art. 1A(2), 1951 Convention. In this respect, the 1951 Convention has a broader scope; social
group membership would encompass linguistic groups, but would also go further. For example,
persecution based on caste, tribe, family, social class, or sexual orientation might fall within the 1951
Convention, but not within the Hungarian Constitution.
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the governments over restrictions on the use of the Hungarian language
in schools and elsewhere.'0 5
In this context, it is not surprising that protection against persecution for
linguistic reasons has attained constitutional status in Hungary. Although
tensions over language and culture are not restricted to regions inhabited
by ethnic Hungarians, Hungarian communities abroad have often been
negatively affected. Consequently this constitutional provision means that
ethnic Hungarians have a significantly greater chance of receiving asylum
in Hungary. The Constitution does not limit asylum claims based on
linguistic grounds to persecution against ethnic Hungarians. German
speakers in Slovakia or Armenian speakers in Azerbaijan can also in
theory seek protection under this provision of the Constitution. 6 As a
matter of fact, however, it is Hungarian speakers who seek asylum in
Hungary based on hostility triggered by the language they speak.
2.2.2 Legislation
In 1993 Parliament enacted new legislation regulating citizenship.' °7
Strictly speaking, this law does not concern refugee protection, but it
interacts with the refugee system in a significant way. In general, an
applicant seeking naturalization must satisfy five requirements, namely,
eight years of continuous residence in Hungary;1°8 no criminal record;' °9
the ability to support oneseli1 1 basic knowledge of the Hungarian
Constitution"' and a showing that naturalization would not be against the
national interest."2 In fact, there are six requirements, for the examination
on the Hungarian Constitution is administered in Hungarian, thus adding
a language requirement. As Hungarian is both unique and unusually
105 Michael J. Jordan, 'Slovalda, Hungary Ink Treaty', Budapest Sun, 23-29 Mar. 1995, at 1.
Indeed, current language disputes have triggered great tension. In late 1995 Slovakia enacted
legislation requiring all official documents and discussion in government offices and in all institutions,
including schools, churches, and private associations, to be written and conducted in Slovakian.
Kornel Dura, 'Slovak Language Law Draws Rebuke From Hungary', Budapest Sun, 30 Nov.-6 Dec.
1995, at 1. This law was greeted with outrage by the large ethnic Hungarian minority in Slovakia
(600,000 out of 5.3 million): 'Instability in Slovalia Prompts Western Concern', and resulted in the
Hunarian government recalling its ambassador to Slovakia Budapest Sun, 2-8 Nov. 1995, at 5.
As explained above, note 101, the 1951 Convention definition rather than the Constitution
definition is the one the refugee officers in Hungary follow. Nevertheless, the Hungarian Constitution's
focus on persecution based on language is relevant in setting the context of the refugee process in
Hungay
1''01993. Evi LV. t6rv~ny a magyar illampolgfirsgr61 = Act No. LV of 1993 concerning
Hungaran Citizenship (hereafter Citizenship Act).
I The residence period must precede the application date: Citizenship Act, para. 4(1)(a).
109 The applicant must have no criminal record and no pending criminal proceedings: Citizenship
Act, para. 4(l)(b).
no Subsistence and residence in Hungary must be ensured: Citizenship Act, para. 4(1)(c).
"' Citizenship Act, para. 4(1)(e).
1 Citizenship Act, para. 4(1)(d).
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difficult, the language criterion will serve as a much more serious obstacle
to obtaining citizenship than will the constitutional knowledge prerequisite.
The law relaxes the citizenship requirements for certain applicants.
Specifically, the legislation reduces the continuous residence requirement
from eight to three years for several categories of applicants for
naturalization:.. those married to Hungarian citizens;14 those whose
minor child is a Hungarian citizen;"' those adopted by a Hungarian
citizen; 6 or those recognized by Hungarian authorities as refugees."
7
The law reduces the continuous residence requirement even further, to
one year, for one category: ethnic Hungarians." 8
The preferential treatment offered by the citizenship law mirrors some
of the distinctions that can be perceived in the constitutional law on asylum.
Both the asylum provision in the Constitution and the naturalization law
are written in neutral language; they protect all those recognized as
refugees, whether ethnic Hungarian or not. Indeed, the citizenship law
clearly treats refugees better than most other non-citizens of Hungary.
Refugees receive a substantial advantage because they need only satisfy
a three-year residency requirement," 9 a substantial advantage over the
eight-year requirement imposed on most citizenship applicants.
Nevertheless, ethnic Hungarians are even better off than refugees, for
they need only satisfy a one-year residency requirement, in addition they
benefit from other advantages. For example, they are almost sure to be
able to pass an examination in Hungarian, a language spoken by fewer
than 15 million people which poses major barriers to the rest of the
people in the world. They also are more likely to be acquainted with the
structure of the Hungarian government and other basic constitutional
knowledge.
Furthermore, under Hungarian law the decision to grant naturalization
11 Certain naturalization applicants need only satisfy a three-year continuous residence
requirement plus fulfil the other four requirements listed above: Citizenship Act, para. 4(2).
14 This is restricted to those who have lived with a Hungarian citizen for three years or more in
a valid marriage. The time can be shortened if the spouse died: Citizenship Act, para. 4(2)(a).
"1 Citizenship Act, para. 4(2)(b).
116 Citizenship Act, para. 4(2)(c).
"17 Citizenship Act, para. 4(2)(d).
18 A non-Hungarian citizen who asserts that he or she is an ethnic Hungarian and has an
ancestor who was a Hungarian citizen may apply after one year in Hungary so long as the other
standard citizenship requirements are satisfied. Citizenship Act, para. 4(3). This does not extend to
all former citizens/subjects of Hungary, which included many ethnic Romanians, Serbs, Slovaks,
Germans, among others. Indeed, ethnic Hungarians only comprised 50-55% of the population of
Hungary in 1910: Taylor, above note 4, at 290.
11 Although other barriers might prevent refugees from obtaining Hungarian citizenship, such
as the Hungarian language test on constitutional knowledge or the 'against the national interest'
requirement, few citizenship laws are more generous for refugees than Hungary's. In the United
States, refugees and other permanent resident aliens face a five-year residency requirement: 8 U.S.C.
§ 1427(a)(1). In Germany, the residency requirement is 10 years, shortened to 7 years for those
granted official refugee status. See European Council on Refugees and Exiles, Asyur in Europe, vol.
2, 194 (4th ed., 1994).
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is totally discretionary.' 20 Negative decisions are not accompanied by
explanations and cannot be appealed.'2' Although there are no reliable
statistics concerning naturalization decisions, it would not be surprising
if the decision-makers,"' consciously or subconsciously, considered
Hungarian heritage a positive factor. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
most of those granted citizenship in the past few years have been ethnic
Hungarians.
Thus, the citizenship law on its face favours ethmic Hungarians over
refugees and any other applicants. Moreover, other provisions of the
citizenship law that at first glance appear neutral, in fact favour ethnic
Hungarians. Lastly, it appears that the discretionary naturalization
decisions may in practice favour applicants of Hungarian origin.
2.2.3 Decree
Most of the laws that affect refugees in Hungary have not been enacted
by Parliament. Rather they have been promulgated by decree. In October
1989, several months after Hungary's ratification of the 1951 Geneva
Convention, the government issued Decree 101 in order to implement the
Convention and Protocol. 123 The Decree regulates the refugee recognition
procedure from beginning to end.1 24 It contains several provisions that,
as applied, have resulted in preferential treatment of ethnic Hungarians.
It contains only twenty-two sections, and is less than comprehensive.
There are gaps within topics; also entire topics are omitted. For example,
there is no mention of people seeking temporary protection, rather than
asylum, in Hungary. Nonetheless, Decree 101 provides the basic legal
structure.
120 Citizenship Act, para. 6(l);Judit T6th, 'Who Are the Desirable Immigrants in Hungary Under
the Newly Adopted Laws?' in Fullerton, et al., Refugees and Migrants, 57, 60.
121 Ibid.
'2 The citizenship statute grants the President ofthe Republic of Hungary the authority to decide
naturalization applications, based on the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior. Citizenship
Act, para. 6(1). The Department of Citizenship [Allampolg~Arsgi Foosztilya] of the Ministry of the
Interior processes the applications on behalf of the Minister.
"' 101/1989. (IX. 28.) MT rendelet a menekflkfnt val6 elismersrOl = Cabinet Decree 101 of
28 Sept. 1989 on the Recognition Process for Refugees (hereafter Decree 101). As Hungary follows
a dualist, rather than monist, legal tradition, its accession to the Convention and Protocol bound
Hungary on the international plane only. Domestic implementation of the law needed further
government action, which occurred with Decree 101: Nagy, above note 29, at 52.
124 It begins with provisions addressed to asylum seekers crossing the Hungarian border: 'This
decree shall apply to the non-Hungarian nationals who, having crossed the frontier of the Hungarian
People's Republic, apply for recognition as refugees' (section 1), and ends with provisions allowing
judicial review of the denial of refugee status (section 19). The concluding provisions address the
three-month deadline on seeking extensions of time (section 20); non-Hungarian nationals present
in Hungary at the time the decree came into force, as well as those who later might be lawfully
present in Hungary on non-refugee grounds and subsequently seek to apply for refugee status (section
21); and the effective date of the decree, 15 Oct. 1989 (section 22).
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Application deadlines. Decree 101 sets forth a short period of time (72 hours
after crossing the border into Hungary) in which refugee applicants must
notify the police or border guards that they are seeking refugee status.'25
Once this notice is given, there is a second period of 72 hours, within
which applicants must submit formal applications for recognition as a
refugee.'26 On their face these provisions are neutral, but in practice they
provide a significant advantage to ethnic Hungarians. The 72-hour
deadlines are short. Those who do not speak the language are likely to
have a much harder time ascertaining that there is a deadline and
complying with it. Furthermore, many ethnic Hungarians have relatives
or friends in Hungary, who can learn how the refugee system works and
can assist the newcomers in manoeuvring their way through.'2 7
Once a refugee application is filed, it triggers another set of deadlines. 2 8
Government officials schedule personal interviews with the applicants to
decide who is eligible for refugee status.2 9 The applicants bear the burden
of proof in the procedure,13 and again, those who can speak Hungarian
and who may have relatives or others who can provide information and
assistance have a great advantage. They can rely on more help in
assembling documents and other information to support their claim.
Moreover, to the extent their claim rests upon persecution of ethnic
Hungarians in neighbouring states, there is a better chance that the
Hungarian officials will be aware of the unrest and tension in those
communities.
125 Decree 101, section 3.
126 Technically, this second 72-hour period begins to run from the time of arriving at a refugee
camp or at one of the three mentioned police stations: the Central Police Station in Budapest, the
County of Csongrid, or the County of Szabolcs-Szatnfir. The application shall be filed on a
government form, a copy of which is attached as an Appendix to the Decree: Decree 101, section
4(1)27 Candidates for refugee status spend the time between their arrival at the refugee camp and
the hearing on their refugee application in a separate, closed section of the camp, Decree 101,
section 7(1). During this quarantine period, which typically lasts one week (Interview, B6la Sz&kely,
Director, B&6scsaba Refugee Camp, 6 Jun. 1995), medical screening and tests are done on each
candidate: section 8(2)(b). While in the refugee camp the applicants surrender their passports or
identity documents to the camp authorities: section 8(2)(c). In return they receive identity documents
that entitle them to remain in Hungary during the process, to stay in the camp and use its services
free of charge, and to receive free medical care: section 9.
128 The eligibility officers have 30 days from the date the application was submitted in which to
make decisions on the applications, which may be extended once by 60 days: section 10(l),(2).
Section 11(1) allows further gathering of evidence in special cases where the available information
is insufficient and the current information indicates that it is possible the applicant should be
recognized as a refugee. At present, the eligibility officers have been able to meet the deadlines in
most cases: Interview, Istvhn Dob6, Chief, Division of State Administrative Procedure (Appeals
Division), Office for Refugees and Migrant Affairs, Department of Interior, Budapest, 23 Mar. 1995.
129 Decree 101, section 11. In some refugee camps, such as B&6scsaba, the eligibility officers are
stationed right on the premises. Other eligibility offices are located in cities in the south and east of
Hungary, and in Budapest: Interviews, Agnes Ambrus, UNHCR Legal Protection Officer, Budapest,
28 Nov. 1994; 1 Aug. 1995.
130 Decree 101, section 11(1).
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The refugee definition. Decree 101 defines those who can be recognized as
refugees.13 ' It explicitly incorporates the refugee definition set forth in the
1951 Convention.'3 2 Thus, Decree 101 defines as refugees those who
have a well-founded fear of persecution due to race, religion, national
origin, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.
3
As discussed earlier, Hungary adopted the 1951 Convention refugee
definition subject to a major restriction: only those whose fear of
persecution stems from events occurring in Europe are included.'34 Thus,
as a matter of treaty law, and of national law implementing the treaty,
Hungary will, in practice, only afford refugee status to Europeans. 135
Acknowledging that the geographic reservation allows Hungary to
accept only European refugees does not automatically lead to the
conclusion that Hungary accepts only ethnic Hungarian refugees. Indeed,
the statistics indicate that this is not so. Many non-ethnic Hungarians
have been granted protection in Hungary. Of the 133,000 asylum seekers
accepted from 1988 through 1995, more than half were not of Hungarian
background.'36
Yet, the same statistics indicate that the Hungarian refugee procedure
131 Those individuals whose applications arejudged favourably are granted identity cards containing
proof of residence in Hungary and a notation that they enjoy refugee status: section 16(2),(3). If they
are living in a refugee camp they may continue to stay there, receiving room and board and other
assistance provided by the government. Staffmembers in the camps attempt to identify employment
opportunities. Skilled workers, such as electricians, often find work quickly. Others have much more
difficulty. Interviews with Robert Ront6, Staff, Bicske Refugee Camp, 11 Feb., 4 Mar., 2 Apr. 1995.
Those whose applications for refugee status are denied have five days in which to file an appeal:
Decree 101, section 18(1); the first level of review is administrative: section 18(2), the second is to
the courts: section 19(1).
132 'A person who is qualified as a refugee according to article 1, item C, as well as item B, para.
(1), sub-clause a. of the Convention . . .': Decree 101, section 2 (1). In addition, section 1 specifies
that the decree applies only to non-Hungarian nationals who have crossed the borders into Hungary.
133 Persons with a well-founded fear must be outside their country of nationality or, if they lack
a nationality, the country where they formerly resided. Art. 1A(2), 1951 Convention.
134 Decree 101, section 2 expressly incorporates art. 1B(l)(a) of the 1951 Convention, which
provides for the geographic reservation; see above, note 87. As noted above, the 1967 Protocol
removed the 1 Jan. 1951 deadline, a point acknowledged in Decree 101, section 2(1). Thus, Decree
101 has a geographic restriction, but not a time restriction.
135 How treaty law and national decrees implementing treaty law can trump the constitution,
which contains no such geographical restriction, is difficult to comprehend. Nonetheless, as to the
geographical scope of persecution, the Hungarian government follows Decree 101, thereby restricting
refugee status to those fleeing persecution in Europe, and eschews the unlimited geographical
approach of the Constitution: Nagy, above note 29, at 53-4. Furthermore, Decree 101 places
limitations even on those who fear the 'right kind' of persecution on the 'right' continent. Those
whose stay in Hungary interferes with the security of the state, public order, or public health are
not entitled to refugee status even if they face the type of persecution defined in the 1951 Convention:
Decree 101, section 2(b). Needless to say, the 'security of the state', 'public order', and 'public health'
are not defined. In addition, Decree 101 tracks the 1951 Convention and excludes from refugee
status those who have committed a serious non-political crime outside Hungary prior to entering
Hungary, or have committed war crimes, crimes against peace, or crimes against humanity:, section
2(ak See ORMA Statistics 1988-1995, above note 66; of 133,120 asylum seekers from 1988-1995,
75,531 came from former Yugoslavia, most being Croats and Bosnians.
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exercises a powerful bias in favour of ethnic Hungarians. The data reveal
that very few of the asylum seekers actually file applications and seek
recognition as refugees. Approximately 5,000 of the 133,000 have filed
refugee claims and followed the recognition process through to the end.
Roughly 4,000 have been recognized as refugees under Decree 101.137
They are deemed 'Convention refugees' and receive the rights and
benefits mandated by the 1951 Convention. This group also is eligible
for any rights and benefits, such as a shorter residency requirement under
the citizenship legislation law, that Hungarian law accords refugees.
3 8
Most of the Convention refugees, perhaps 3,500 out of 4,000, are ethnic
Hungarians.
Most of these seeking refuge in Hungary, including the overwhelming
majority of the non-Hungarians, never take part in the official refugee
procedure. Instead, they are shunted into a separate category. They are
deemed temporarily protected persons and their cases are not reviewed
to determine whether they satisfy the refugee definition set forth in Decree
101.139 Thus, they never have the opportunity to qualify for refugee status
in Hungary.
The legal status of refugees. The legal status of those the Hungarian authorities
recognize as refugees is set forth in a second decree, also dating from
1989.'" The terms of Law-Decree 19 are quite generous. 4 It provides
that recognized refugees have all the rights of Hungarian citizens'42 with
three exceptions: refugees do not have the right to vote; may not be
137 Ibid. This constitutes 3.17% of the total number of registered asylum seekers.
1- See text accompanying notes 140-6, below.
139 There have been 73,888 temporarily protected persons in Hungary, 55.5% of the total of
registered asylum seekers: ORMA Statistics, 1988-1995, above note 66, at 1.
40 1989. 6vi 19. tbrv6nyerejfi rendelet a menektfltk~nt elismert szem6lyek jogf.ldsfr6l = Law-
Decree No. 19 of 1989 on the legal status of persons recognized as refugees (hereafter Law-Decree
19). The Presidential Council of the Hungarian People's Republic designated certain pronouncements
as a Law-Decree (t6rv6nyerejfi rendelet) in order to indicate that they were more weighty than a
decree (rendelet). The Law-Decree was issued by the government alone, however, and not enacted
by a legislature.
141 The reality of refugee status in Hungary appears to be the same as the law. Those recognized
as refugees experience no legal barriers to work. Anecdotal evidence indicates that they also
experience little, if any, social discrimination in employment: Author's interviews with refugees in
Hungary in winter and spring 1995. Because most recognized refugees in Hungary are ethnic
Hungarians, they do not face the language barriers that are obstacles for refugees in many societies.
Moreover, they are often perceived as fellow countrymen and women who have returned home
after suffering persecution for loyally preserving Hungarian culture. Although the receptivity to
ethnic Hungarian refugees may be diminishing somewhat (see Gy6rgy Csepeli and Endre Sik,
'Changing Content of Political Xenophobia in Hungary - Is the Growth of Xenophobia
Inevitable?' in Fullerton et al. Rfigees and Mgrant, 121, 122-5), the past decade has been marked
by an extraordinary sympathy to ethnic Hungarian communities in surrounding countries, making
Hungary's refugee experience unique.
142 Law-Decree 19, section 1.
143 Ibid., section l(a). The legal barrier against voting can be overcome, of course, once the
refugee becomes naturalized.
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employed in jobs restricted to Hungarian citizens; and do not have to
perform military service. In addition, refugees can receive Hungarian
language classes free of charge. 4 Most important, receiving refugee status
helps those who later seek to become naturalized citizens of Hungary.
As described above, refugee status accelerates eligibility for Hungarian
citizenship. 45 An eight-year residency requirement is reduced to three
years. Moreover, Law-Decree 19 states that recognition as a refugee
shall be considered an extraordinary circumstance in an application for
naturalization."4
Ethnic Hungarians, who constitute the vast majority of those recognized
as refugees, can rely on an even greater acceleration: they are eligible for
naturalization in one year. As their knowledge of Hungarian and their
familiarity with Hungarian law is likely to be greater than that of others
recognized as refugees, their success in obtaining citizenship is also likely
to be vastly greater. Indeed, the preference written into the citizenship
law and the preference that appears to exist in the refugee status procedure
combine to enable a sizeable number of ethnic Hungarians to change
their status from ethnic minority in a neighbouring country to a full
member of Hungarian society. 147
In contrast, those categorized as temporarily protected are put into the
second tier of a two tier system. If they pass a perfunctory screening that
attempts to ascertain their country of origin and their membership in a
group at risk, they are allowed to stay in Hungary."4 The government
attempts to assign them to refugee camps or to provide a rent subsidy
that allows them to live in private housing. As temporarily protected
persons, rather than refugees, they have no rights under Hungarian law.
The law does not recognize their existence. This silence works against
them; they are not allowed to work, and they are sometimes even denied
permission to leave the refugee camp. 149
Refugee camps. A third decree grants the Minister of Interior the power
to establish refugee camps or other refugee shelters.' 0 Also issued in
14 Law-Decree 19, section l(b),(c),(f).
145 See above, text accompanying notes 113-9.
146 Law-Decree 19, section 1(e). In addition, the decree provides that the refugee has the right to
receive travel documents, as defined in the Geneva Convention on Refugees: section l(d).
17 The process is quite short by Western European or US standards, and a positive decision on
refugee status often comes in 2 or 3 months. Interview, Istvin Dob6, above note 128. Twelve months
after that an ethnic Hungarian refugee can apply for citizenship. See above, text accompanying note
118.
148 Interview, Joszef Katai, Chief Eligibility Officer, B6k~scsaba Refugee Camp, 6Jun. 1995.
.. See text accompanying notes 173-8 below.
'so 64/1989. (VI.30.) MT rendelet a menekiilteket befogad6 £llomdsokr6l = Cabinet Decree No.
64, 30 Jun. 1989, on the stations receiving refugees (hereafter Decree 64).
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1989,51 Decree 64 provides broad guidelines for cooperation with other
units of the national government, with local governments, and with non-
governmental organizations.5 2 The refugee camps, in turn, are to provide
food and shelter,'53 assistance with integration into the community,' 4 and
support for obtaining employment and other beneficial activity. 5
The reality is that there have been a variety of different refugee camps
and shelters in Hungary." 6 Their conditions vary, as do their size.'57
Moreover, the majority of people seeking refuge and protection have not
been housed in government-run camps and shelters.'58 Some have stayed
at shelters run by non-government groups such as the Red Cross.'59 Many
have been taken in by relatives. Many others have used their savings,
money sent from relatives abroad, and earnings from work in the
underground economy, to rent private accommodation. 6
Those who live in camps must contend with difficult circumstances.
Institutional living always poses problems, and these appear to be
exacerbated in Hungary by unequal treatment. Although there are
exceptions, the shelters largely inhabited by ethnic Hungarian refugees
in 1995 appeared significantly more desirable than those largely inhabited
by Bosnians and other non-Hungarians. A prime example can be found
in comparing the refugee camp at Bicske with that at NagyatAd.
The camp at Bicske historically has housed many ethnic Hungarian
residents; NagyatAd houses mostly Bosnian residents.' 6' The first noticeable
difference is sheer size. The full capacity at Bicske is approximately
151 Of the three decrees regulating refugees, this was the first to go into effect. It was a response
to the large number of ethnic Hungarians from Transylvania who sought asylum in Hungary in the
late 1980s. See above text accompanying notes 38-55.
152 Decree 64, section 5(l) (cooperation with local government); section 5(2) (with the Red Cross
and church groups); section 5(3) (with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
153 Ibid., section l(1)(a).
1-' Ibid., section l(l)(b).
1ss Ibid., section l(l)(c). It is striking that it explicitly authorizes support for refugees who intend
to leave Hungary for a third country.
l-6 ORMA has established permanent refugee centres at Bicske, Bdk~scsaba, and Hadszoboszl6
and temporary shelters at Nagyat~d, Vase, Mohics, P~cs, Sikl6s, ZAnka, and Csongr-d. In 1995
ORMA opened a new centre at Debrecen, but by that time the camps at Hajdszoboszl6, Csongrad,
Mohfcs, PNcs, Sikl6s, and Zdnka had been dosed: Interview, Agnes Ambrns, above note 129.
157 The camp population in Jan. 1996 was as follows: B&kdscsaba, 200; Bicske, 204; Nagyat~d,
1,590; Debrecen, 621; Wse, 150: Pal Nagy, ORMA Statistics, 19 Feb. 1996.
158 InJan. 1996 there were 7,158 registered asylum seekers; only 2,765 were housed in camps:
ibid.
159 The Red Cross and similar groups have received financial support from the government to
cover some of the costs of providing shelter- Interview, AgnesJantsits, Chief, International Division,
Hungarian Red Cross, 30 Mar. 1995. On the early role of the Hungarian Red Cross in assisting
refugees, see generally Sik & T6th, above note 43, at 65-72.
160 The government provides subsidies to assist with rent and utilities charges to those registered
refugees living in private dwellings in Hungary. Ella Veres, 'Camps Soak Up Funds', Budapest Sun,
10-16 Nov. 1994, at 3.-
16! Laczk6, above note 72, at 174-5.
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200;162 Nagyatd currently has nearly 1,600 residents and could house
up to 3,500.163 The impact of the size of the camp and its population is
noticeable. The smaller one feels like a coherent community, the larger
like a depersonalized institution."6 A second major difference is the
amount of privacy. To some extent this is related to the size of the camp,
and to the type of structures that already existed. In Bicske families
generally have separate accommodation, with a family often assigned to
one room fumished with several beds, a small table with several chairs,
and a dresser or a wardrobe.165 Although meals are provided in a central
dining hall, many families also have a small refrigerator and a hotplate
in their room. The rooms are arranged on a single floor along a central
hall, with perhaps eight rooms in a building.
166
In contrast, the buildings at Nagyat~d betray their origins as a military
post. 167 The buildings are large with multiple stories. 168 The rooms,
formerly used as a barracks, are also large. Consequently, several families,
separated by draped sheets, share one room.'69 Frequently, families
decorate their portion of the space with rugs and blankets they have knit
while in the camp, but the architecture impedes the attempts to personalize
family space. 7° Furthermore, the sheets that separate family areas provide
no soundproofing, so a family cannot gain privacy by retreating to its
own comer of the room.'
7
A third major difference between the two camps is in the freedom to
leave. The residents of the Bicske refugee camp face no restrictions on
leaving and returning, "' but in Nagyatdd the camp administration permits
only a certain number of residents to leave each day.173 The stated reason
is that the large refugee population of 2,000 to 3,000 would cause 'serious
problems' in a small town of 12,000 or so.74 The policy of limiting the
number of refugees who could go outside the camp each day continued,
162 Interview, Janos Einwachter, Director, Bicske Refugee Camp, Dec. 1994.
16 Interview, Lajos Horvth, Director, Nagyatd Refugee Camp, 1 Dec. 1994. At times Nagyatid
has exceeded capacity and sheltered up to 3,800 refugees: Interview, Peter Wijninga, Chief, UNHCR
Sub-Office, Pres, 1 Dec. 1994.
16 Laczk6, above note 72, at 174-6.
165 Interviews with Robert Ront6, Staff, Bicske Refugee Camp, 11 Feb., 4 Mar., and 2 Apr.
1995; author's visits to Bicske Refugee Camp, 22 Dec. 1994; 2 Apr. 1995.
'6 Ibid.
167 HorvAth, above note 74, at 145.
'6 For a short description of NagyatAd Refugee Camp, see Eva V. Huseby-Darvas, 'Puzzling
Voices, Pleading Words: Refugee Issues, Refugee Camps and Refugee Women in Hungary', in
Fullerton et aL., eds., Rfugees and Mirant, 153, 159.
169 Author's visit to Nagyatid Refugee Camp, 1 Dec. 1994.
170 Ibid.
171 Ibid.
172 Laczk6, above note 72, at 175.
173 Ibid.
"' HorvAth, above note 74, at 148, n. 5.
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however, even when the camp population fell to fewer than 600.75 This
policy, initiated by the camp director in response to a request of the local
municipal authorities,176 has many unfortunate consequences. The lack
of freedom has created a certain prison-like atmosphere, even though
that may not have been intended. It has given rise to a black market in
passes,' and has resulted in palpable discrimination based on sex. Even
though the passes are not officially restricted to men, in practice most
are used by men. The women generally stay to take care of the children
whose schooling finishes early in the day.'78 Since it is perceived that the
women cannot make full use of the few passes that are available, they
rarely receive them.'79
Although it is clearly more desirable to live in a refugee camp with no
restrictions on leaving and entering, the point here is not to criticize the
reasons articulated for the restrictive policy at the NagyatAd refugee
shelter. Rather the point is that the camp that is much less hospitable,
owing to its size, the concomitant lack of privacy, and the restricted
freedom of movement, by and large does not house ethnic Hungarians.
In contrast, the smaller, more congenial camp in Bicske has historically
housed ethnic Hungarian refugees. In this respect, the preference for
ethnic Hungarian refugees detected in the legal provisions is also reflected
in the daily life of refugees. 80
Discriminatogy treatment. An outside observer will note a marked difference
in the treatment of refugees in Hungary, and ethnic Hungarian asylum
seekers appear to benefit on every measure. This can doubtless be
explained in part by non-discriminatory factors, such as the timing and
sequence of the refugee movements. Perhaps the refugees who arrived in
Hungary first, in the late 1980s, tended to be sheltered in small refugee
camps. Those who arrived later, in 1991 and 1992, came in large numbers
and tended to be accommodated in large camps opened in response to
needs. 8' As the first wave of refugees was primarily ethnic Hungarian,
and the second was not, this might explain the difference in the character
of the camps. However, this is no more than a partial explanation. The
175 In mid-1995 human rights groups in Hungary organized a joint mission to evaluate and
monitor conditions at the Nagyat~d Refugee Camp. The camp director indicated that restrictions
on leaving the camp would be removed.
176 Horvith, above note 74, at 148, n.5.
17 Wijninga interview, above note 163.
178 HorvAth interview, above note 163.
179 Moreover, camp officials hold the distinct view that leaving the camp is more important for
the men than for the women: Horvith, above note 74, at 148.
180 See generally Laczk6, above note 72, at 174-6.
181 For example, the Bicske refugee camp was opened earlier than the NagyatAd camp, when the
first flows of refugees were predominantly ethnic Hungarians from Romania. Nagyatid was opened
in August 1991, when the refugees from the war in Yugoslavia began pouring into Hungary. Opened
as a temporary shelter pending return of the refugees in a matter of months, it remained in active
operation for more than five years.
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camp populations have not been static and although there has been a
substantial turnover,"' the difference in the characteristics of the camp
population has remained.
One of the starkest differences in treatment involves the distinction
between those accorded refugee status and those accorded temporary
protection. More than 90 per cent of those deemed refugees, and thus
entitled to virtually the same rights as citizens, are ethnic Hungarians.1 83
More than 90 per cent of those deemed temporarily protected persons,
who are assisted with food and shelter but denied many other rights,
including the right to work legally, are not ethnic Hungarians.1 On their
face the statistics are damning, but the factors that have contributed to
channelling asylum seekers into these categories must be examined to see
if there are non-discriminatory explanations for the situation.
For example, the circumstances that compelled people to flee might
account for the difference in treatment. Perhaps more of the asylum seekers
who fled Romania left traditional political persecution: A totalitarian state
that tolerated no dissidence and viewed with hostility any cohesive group
that did not exist to further government aims.'85 In Ceausescu's Romania,
the Hungarian minority, an ethnic group with pre-existing loyalties, with
independent and long-standing cultural traditions, and with a language
different from that of the government, was viewed with suspicion and
worse.'86 Consequently, many of the ethnic Hungarian asylum seekers
from Romania fell neatly into the traditional refugee definition: Those
persecuted for their practices and beliefs.
In contrast, perhaps many of the asylum seekers who fled the former
Yugoslavia left due to war. Although families fleeing artillery fire evoke
sympathy in news stories, they often do not readily fall into the traditional
refugee definition. This is because the harm that war refugees flee is
generally viewed as danger due to their being unfortunate bystanders
rather than danger due to their practices and beliefs. Accordingly, some
might argue that asylum seekers fleeing Yugoslavia are fleeing generalized
wartime conditions and thus are entitled to temporary protection rather
than refugee status.
Again, as with the timing of the refugee arrivals, this can be a partial
explanation at most. The war in former Yugoslavia has not been the
182 Many camp residents have left and been replaced by those who arrived later. For example,
in 1991 the Nagyatid camp population was 85% Croat and 12% ethnic Hungarian: Horvith, above
note 74, at 145 n.2. In 1994 the population was 77% Bosnian, 10% Croat, and 8% ethnic Hungarians:
ibid., 146. Nonetheless, in 1995 the Bicske camp still retains its flavour as an ethnic Hungarian
camnp, while the NagyatAd facility dearly is a camp of non-ethnic Hungarians.
Nagy, above note 29, at 52. See Nagy, above note 43, at 130, 138 n. 27; Laczk6, above note
72, at 173.
a Nagy, above note 43, at 130.185 Cipkowski, above note 48, at 120-5.
"'6 Ibid., 127-8.
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ordinary war. It has distinguished itself by publicly acknowledged ethnic
cleansing, 87 a classic form of political and religious persecution. Although
many asylum seekers from former Yugoslavia may have fled solely to
avoid bombardment, many fled because they were members of a group
expressly targeted to be forced to leave or be killed.' 88 The media covering
the situation in former Yugoslavia again and again published reports of
persecution aimed at specific groups.'8 9 Indeed, the leaders of the Serb
forces in Bosnia made it easy to recognize the persecution because they
publicly vilified non-Serbs 9 . as foreign occupying forces who should be
evacuated or eradicated from Serb lands. Moreover, many asylum seekers
who arrived in Hungary confirmed the reports of ethmic cleansing with
consistent tales of being driven away from their lands and homes solely
because they had been born into the targeted group.' 9' Accordingly,
although it might be possible to say that many asylum seekers from
former Yugoslavia were those traditionally viewed as war refugees and
were properly channelled into the temporary protection category, rather
than into the refugee process, many others satisfied the traditional refugee
definition and should have been accorded access to the refugee process
in Hungary.
Another factor that may have contributed to the channelling of ethnic
Hungarian asylum seekers into the refugee category and non-ethnic
Hungarian asylum seekers into the temporary protection category is the
different expectations with which they left home. Most ethnic Hungarian
asylum seekers came from Romania and describe their lives there as slow,
steady oppression, occasionally punctuated by threats of violence." 2 After
187 Kinzer, above note 2: Bosnian Serbs say their self-proclaimed state cannot exist with pockets
of Muslim inhabitants.
188 See, for example, Horvhth, above note 74, at 146 (forcible removal of Bosnians by Serbs).
The details vary depending on the timing and sequence of the refugees arrival in Hungary. Many
who fled to Hungary in the summer of 1991 were Croats who lived in the northeast comer of
Croatia, in the vicinity of Vukovar. The long siege of Vukovar and the incessant artillery attacks
may have triggered substantial flows of families desperate to escape the dangers of traditional warfare;
see Harden, above note 56. Later, personal stories and news reports, particularly of Bosnian asylum
seekers, described many more incidents of ethnic cleansing. No doubt, both reasons for flight
coexisted simultaneously in many individuals.
189 For example, Chris Hedges, 'Conflict in the Balkans: The Fighting', .New ork Tes, 26 Jul.
1995, at A-9 (ethnic cleansing in Zepa); Kinzer, above note 2 (UN High Commissioner for Refugees
says Srebrenica most blatant example yet of ethnic cleansing).
190 Or 'Muslims' or 'Mujahadin' or 'Fascists' or 'Ustashi', depending on the target and the level
of invective used. See Storer H. Rowley, 'More Croatian Towns Are Falling to Serbs', Chicago
Tribune, 29 Aug. 1991 at 2 (Serbs say Croats are Fascists and Nazis); Storer H. Rowley, 'Terror Cuts
Two Ways in Yugoslavia', Chicago Tiaune, 1 Sept. 1991, at 3 (Serbs say Croats are Ustashi).
191 Interviews with recently arrived Bosnian asylum seekers, Bfkscsaba Refugee Camp, 6 Jun.
1995. Interviews with ethnic Hungarian asylum seekers, Wse Refugee Camp, 1 Dec. 1994. Interview
with Sz6kely, above note 127; interview with Wijninga, above note 163; interview with Philippe
Labreveux, UNHCR Representative, Hungary, Budapest, May 1995.
192 Interviews with refugees, Bieske, 11 Feb., 4 Mar. 1995.
528 Mayellen Fullerton
enduring this for years, they planned their departure for Hungary. 93
They left with the hope of starting a new life there. 94
In contrast, the non-ethnic Hungarian asylum seekers largely came
from former Yugoslavia. They describe their lives before the war in
positive terms. They left suddenly, when war or ethnic cleansing erupted
near them. 9 5 They left with the hope that this was temporary madness.
They expected to return home in a short time, and there are many stories
of asylum seekers who arrived in mid-1991, having scheduled their
summer vacation to cover their time in Hungary! 96
Furthermore, although there was no legal prohibition on seeking
refugee status, most of the others streaming in from former Yugoslavia
viewed themselves as people in need of temporary protection, and
considered it appropriate to be placed in temporary protection status. 97
Thus, it would be natural for others fleeing to Hungary from the same
conflagration to consider themselves, too, as candidates for temporary
protection status rather than refugee status, especially since temporary
protection comported with their original perspective on their situation.
In addition, the relative living standards in Hungary, Romania, and
former Yugoslavia may have been another factor encouraging asylum
seekers from one state to seek refugee status and those from another not
to seek it. For many asylum seekers from Romania, the living standard
in Hungary was a significant improvement.'9 8 This would contribute to
their desire to seek refugee status and start a new life in Hungary. For
many asylum seekers from former Yugoslavia, the living standard in
Hungary was a step down.1 99 This would make the asylum process and
refugee status in Hungary less attractive, and the desire to return home
stronger.
The difficulty is that the temporary crisis has not been a short-term
one. Many who arrived thinking they could return to their homeland in
a few months have now spent several years in Hungary.2" Second-class
status and the inability to work legally are easy to ignore or tolerate for
a few months. When the few months become years, these disadvantages
begin to chafe. In particular, the lack of ability to work legally has ensured
that temporarily protected persons remain wards of the state. Moreover,
it has decreased families' abilities to function in a normal manner,
depriving them of the opportunity to help themselves now and making
193 Sik et al., above note 42, at 27.
'94 Ibid., at 36-7.
195 Laczk6, above note 72, at 174-5: 54% of Bosnians left home with less than 1 hour's notice;
this was true of 34% of Croats, 28% of ethnic Hungarians.
196 Horvith, above note 74, at 147.
197 Ibid.
198 Nagy, above note 21, at 30.
'99 Ibid.
200 Horvth, above note 74, at 145-7.
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it increasingly unlikely they will be able to be self-sufficient in the
future.2
01
As the temporary stay became long-term, if not permanent, the
importance of the legal rights that accompany refugee status became
more obvious. This realization generally came too late, however. Refugee
status was now out of reach of those in temporary protection status, no
matter how dearly they may have been able to satisfy the refugee criteria
in the beginning. By the time they acknowledged that their plight would
not be short-term and that the legal conditions defining their stay in
Hungary were important, they had long since missed the various
72-hour, 20 2 or even 3-month,23 deadlines for filing applications for refugee
status. Hungarian law has no provisions allowing asylum seekers to switch
from temporary protection status to refugee status in mid-stream.
Although there may have been nothing malevolent in 1991 and 1992
about channelling asylum seekers from former Yugoslavia into temporary
protection status rather than refugee status, this channelling continued
long after the difficulties of doing so were identified. Throughout 1995,
as new asylum seekers from Bosnia made their ways from forced labour
camps and ethnically cleansed villages to the southern border of Hungary,
they continued to be viewed as temporarily protected persons.2 4 Like
their predecessors in 1991 and 1992, these asylum seekers may have
believed that they only needed short-term protection. Even so, on the
basis of the experience of the preceding decade, Hungarian officials
should have known that the refugee process was the appropriate path for
many of the newcomers. Yet, notwithstanding the human rights reports
and the earlier experience, the Bosnian asylum seekers continued to be
considered as applicants for temporary protection status.
Other unsettling information concerning the disparate treatment of
ethnic and non-etimic Hungarian refugees arose from a series of interviews
with refugees. 05 Many ethnic Hungarians granted refugee status told
stories of hard times and uncomfortable circumstances in their home
countries. They recounted discrimination and their fears of the
discrimination they and their children might face in the future. Whether
this harsh treatment rose to the level of persecution was unclear, as is
often the case. Nonetheless, it was striking that many ethnic Hungarians
granted refugee status in the early 1990s recounted experiences that did
not appear to constitute persecution. Their stories were more consonant
with those of traditional immigrants, impelled to launch a new life in
201 Laczk6, above note 72, at 176.
22 Decree 101, section 3, above notes 125-6 and accompanying text.
203 Decree 101, section 20 (applications for extension of deadlines must be submitted within 3
months of the deadline).
M Interviews with officials and asylum seekers in B6kfscsaba Refugee Camp, 6Jun. 1995.
205 Interviews, 1 Dec. 1994, 11 Feb., 4 Mar., 2 Apr., 6Jun. 1995.
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more promising surroundings, than they were with those of traditional
refugees, forced to flee persecution.
In contrast, many of the Bosnians granted temporary protection
recounted chilling tales of being taken at gunpoint to forced labour
camps.0 6 Others spoke of being ordered to sell their homes and lands,
and then commanded to pay the proceeds as they were forced to board
buses that would remove them from their homeland.0 7 Their stories,
corroborated by international government officials working with
refugees, 0 8 left little doubt that they had a well-founded fear of persecution
based on their cultural background and religion.
Conclusion
Interviews with refugees, visits to refugee shelters, discussions with refugee
workers, and meetings with government officials all lead to the conclusion
that there is a two tier refugee system in Hungary. The top tier, by and
large, is inhabited by ethnic Hungarians, the bottom tier by refugees of
other ancestry. An examination of the refugee laws, in light of the
historical and geographical context, also provides evidence that Hungary
is particularly hospitable to asylum seekers from ethnic Hungarian
communities. Traces of an unacknowledged preference for ethnic
Hungarian asylum seekers can be detected in several legal provisions.
For example, knowing that many in Hungary feel a special kinship
with ethnic Hungarians beyond the borders and may wish to support
their decision to move to Hungary sheds light on the constitutional
provision concerning asylum. An awareness of this sense of kinship explains
facets of the new legislation regulating citizenship. Even Hungary's
geographical reservation to the 1951 Convention assumes new meaning
in light of the large ethnic Hungarian communities in neighbouring
countries.
More persuasive evidence of a preference for ethnic Hungarians can
be seen in the actual working of the refugee system. Neutral legal rules
and principles are not applied neutrally. Those who gain access to the
initial stages of the refugee procedure, those whose claims actually are
adjudicated, those whose refugee claims are successful, those who benefit
from the social programmes and the financial support programmes for
refugees overwhelmingly are ethnic Hungarians.
The refugee law and system in Hungary provide substantial assistance
to ethnic Hungarians who wish to emigrate to Hungary and less assistance
than would be expected to non-Hungarians fleeing the threat of
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persecution. The discrimination in favour of ethnic Hungarians itself is
not evil or morally reprehensible. Indeed, to many people it may seem
natural. Nonetheless, this discrimination in the refugee system works on
two levels and is troubling on both. First, it appears that ethnic Hungarians
who are fleeing persecution are granted refugee status in much greater
numbers than others who are fleeing persecution. Second, it appears that
ethnic Hungarians who wish to leave lives of discrimination and hardship,
but are not fleeing persecution, are often granted refugee status.
The first phenomenon is a problem of exclusion. Refugees who are
not ethnic Hungarians stand less chance of being granted refugee status
in Hungary than do their ethnic Hungarian counterparts. The second
phenomenon is a problem of inclusion of non-refugees. Ethnic Hungarians
who do not face a well-founded fear of persecution stand a greater chance
of being granted refugee status in Hungary. This approach has perverted
the refugee system into an immigration system.
An immigration system is not evil. Furthermore, there is nothing illegal
about encouraging and supporting immigration to Hungary by ethnic
Hungarians. There is no inconsistency in welcoming both immigrants
and refugees to Hungary. Ethnic Hungarian immigrants, however, should
not be characterized as refugees and should not be supported by funds
set aside for refugees. This misleads the public in Hungary and in the
international community about the extent of Hungary's refugee burden
and the assistance needed for refugees. Moreover, it sends a cynical
message to Hungarian society that the legal system can and should be
manipulated. It subverts the rule of law. In a country that is working to
establish a return to the rule of law after four decades of communist
party control, this misuse of the refugee law is a serious problem.
